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Inconsistencies in and the inadequacies of the family counselling and FDR 
confidentiality and admissibility provisions: The need for reform 
 
This article discusses issues arising from counselling and family dispute 
resolution (FDR) in relation to confidentiality and admissibility, such as 
whether an admission of abuse to a child, or a threat to harm the other parent, 
can be disclosed by the counsellor or family dispute resolution practitioner 
(FDRP) and used in court proceedings. It is found that the admissibility 
provisions in the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) are far more narrowly defined 
than the confidentiality requirements and have been interpreted strictly by the 
courts. There are competing policy considerations: the strict “traditionalist” 
approach that people can have absolute faith in the integrity of counsellors 
and mediators and in the confidential nature of the process must be balanced 
against a more “protectionist” stance, being the individual rights of victims to 
have all relevant information placed before the court and to be protected from 
violence and abuse. It is suggested that legislative reform is required to ensure 
that courts balance these considerations appropriately and don’t compromise 
the safety of victims of abuse and family violence. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Unfortunately, not all parenting cases that are referred to family counselling or family dispute 
resolution (FDR) end in resolution.1 Some involve parents in high conflict where disputes 
must ultimately be resolved by family courts. In a small number of cases judicial officers 
have been asked to decide legal issues in relation to confidentiality and admissibility that 
have arisen subsequent to these processes. In the past it was common practice for family 
counsellors and family dispute resolution practitioners (FDRPs) to declare at the outset that 
everything said during the counselling or FDR session would be confidential,2 but this 
statement is no longer accurate. There are specific provisions that govern confidentiality and 
admissibility, being the counselling provisions (ss 10D and 10E) and the FDR provisions (ss 
10H and 10J) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).3 Since their inception, judicial officers have 
been required to interpret the intricacies of these provisions in the context of legal issues 
arising subsequent to counselling and mediation.  
                                                            
* Senior Lecturer, Queensland University of Technology law Faculty, Accredited Family Dispute Resolution Practioner. Nationally 
Accredited Mediator. 
1 In this article the terms “family dispute resolution (FDR)” and “mediation”, and “family dispute resolution practitioners (FDRPs)” and 
“mediators” will be used interchangeably.  
1 Prior to the 2006 amendments to the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) a family and child counsellor and community mediator were required to 
take an oath of secrecy under ss 19 and 19K (however this was subject to s 19N, that will be discussed later in this article). They also had 
immunity under s 19M. 
1 These provisions were inserted in the 2006 amendments to the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) by the Family Law Amendment (Parental 
Responsibility) Act 2006 (Cth).  
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 This article discusses some of the recent cases that have shed light on how judicial 
officers have interpreted these key provisions. It will focus on whether statements made by 
parties, while a counsellor is conducting counselling or a FDRP is conducting FDR, such as: 
admissions of abuse; information that may give rise to a risk of abuse to a child; or threats to 
harm the other parent, are confidential and inadmissible or fall within the exceptions. For the 
latter issue there are not yet any FDR cases.4 However, judicial consideration of cases 
concerning statements made in counselling sessions can provide guidance to both family 
counsellors and FDRPs.  
 These cases reveal some inconsistencies in approaches and some concerning practical 
issues in relation to the operation of these provisions. In particular, they raise concerns in 
relation to how courts have balanced the competing policy considerations. It is be argued that 
the traditional approach, that people can have absolute faith in the integrity of counsellors and 
mediators and in the confidential nature of the process, must be balanced against a more 
protectionist stance, being the individual rights of victims to have all relevant information 
placed before the court and to be protected from family violence and abuse. It is suggested 
that legislative reform is required to ensure that the safety of the victims of abuse and family 
violence is not compromised. 
FAMILY COUNSELLING AND FAMILY DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
“Family counselling” is defined as a process in which a family counsellor helps: 
 (a) one or more persons deal with personal and interpersonal issues within a marriage; or 
 (b) one or more persons (including children) who are affected, or likely to be affected, by 
separation or divorce to deal with: 
                                                            
4 Note, however, the case of Rastall v Ball [2010] FMCAfam 1290 in which Reithmuller FM held that Intake was a separate phase of FDR 
from the conducting of FDR and that all of the Intake process was not confidential. This article will focus on the stage of the process where 
the FDRP is conducting FDR and the counsellor is conducting counselling, not on Intake. 
4 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 10B. 
4 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss 11A-11G. For a more detailed discussion of the definition of “family counselling” see Chisholm R, 
“Confidentiality and ‘Family Counselling’ Under the Family Law Act 1975” in Hayes A and Higgins D (eds), Families, Policy and the Law: 
Selected Essays on Contemporary Issues for Australia (AIFS, 2014) p 185, available at http://aifs.gov.au/institute/pubs/fpl/index.html. 
4 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 60I. 
4 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 10G. 
4 Family Law (Family Dispute Resolution Practitioner) Regulations 2008 (Cth), regs 4-11. 
4 Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 (Cth) at [105]-[106]. Discussed in Harman J, “Confidentiality in 
Family Dispute Resolution and Family Counselling: Recent Cases and Why They Matter” (2001) 17(3) Journal of Family Studies 204 
at208. 
4 Family Law (Family Dispute Resolution Practitioner) Regulations 2008 (Cth), reg 25. For a detailed discussion of Intake see Kochanski L, 
“Family Dispute Resolution – The Importance of Intake” (2011) 1 Fam L Rev 164. 
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(i) personal and interpersonal issues; or  
(ii) issues relating to the care of children.5 
 A family counsellor is a person accredited or authorised under s 10C of the Family Law 
Act. For the purposes of this article, family counsellors are those people who provide services 
outside of court settings and do not include family consultants who are involved in reportable 
processes.6 
 In contrast “family dispute resolution” (FDR) refers to a mediation process where there 
are parenting issues and, at the conclusion of the process, the mediator may issue a certificate 
stating whether both parties have made a “genuine effort” to negotiate.7 It also refers to a 
process where the FDRP is independent of the parties.8 To be eligible to issue certificates the 
mediator must be an accredited FDRP and be registered with the Commonwealth Attorney-
General’s Department.9 
 Although both family counselling and FDR processes can be used to assist parents make 
appropriate post-separation parenting arrangements, they can be distinguished from each 
other. For example, “Family and child counselling” is concerned “both with the 
psychological health and relationships issues” of the family and parents.10 They are also 
different to the extent that FDRPs have a clear legislative obligation to conduct what has been 
termed an “Intake and Assessment” prior to organising FDR.11 There are multiple purposes to 
Intake. First, family mediators must ensure that the particular case is suitable for mediation. 
For example, if there is extreme urgency, or certain issues are still being investigated, such as 
child protection allegations, FDR may not be appropriate.12 The practitioner must then make 
                                                            
 
6 Family Law (Family Dispute Resolution Practitioner) Regulations 2008 (Cth), reg 25(1)(b). 
6 Family Law (Family Dispute Resolution Practitioner) Regulations 2008 (Cth), reg 25(2). 
6 Family Law (Family Dispute Resolution Practitioner) Regulations 2008 (Cth), reg 25 and 29. 
6 Family Law (Family Dispute Resolution Practitioner) Regulations 2008 (Cth), reg 28. 
6 Family Law (Family Dispute Resolution Practitioner) Regulations 2008 (Cth), reg 28(b). 
6 Family Law (Family Dispute Resolution Practitioner) Regulations 2008 (Cth), reg 28(c). 
6 The counselling provisions are not identical to the FDR provisions but the exceptions in relation to confidentiality and admissibility, which 
are focused on in this article, are the same.  
6 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss 10D(1), 10H(1). 
6 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss 10D(2)-(4), 10H(2)-(4). 
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an assessment of potential power imbalances and whether each parent will have the capacity 
to “negotiate freely” during a mediation process13 and, if so, gather information about the 
parties and their issues and ensure that the mediation is structured in an appropriate way.14 
The FDRP is also required to provide certain information to the parties about the FDR 
process and his or her qualifications and fees. 15  
 Included in the information that FDRPs must disclose to parents during Intake is an 
explanation of the confidentiality16 and admissibility17 provisions under ss 10H and 10J of the 
Family Law Act. Counsellors should also discuss the equivalent counselling provisions, ss 
10D and 10E, with their clients. These provisions are examined below. 
SECTIONS 10D AND 10H: CONFIDENTIALITY 
Confidentiality of communications in counselling and FDR is dealt with in ss 10D and 10H 
of the Family Law Act.18 Those provisions set out that, generally, a counsellor or FDRP must 
not disclose a communication made while conducting family counselling or FDR, except in 
certain exceptional circumstances.19 The exceptions that are relevant to the discussion in this 
article are as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
12 And Registrars, lawyers and Independent Children’s Lawyers and arbitrators. Family Court Act 1997 (WA), s 160. 
12 Children Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic), s 182. 
12 Children Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic), s 184 
12 Children Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic), s 162 
12 Children’s Protection Act 1993 (SA), s 11. 
12 Defined as sexual, physical, emotional abuse or neglect, Children’s Protection Act 1993 (SA), s 6. 
12 Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1997 (Tas), s 13. 
12 Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1997 (Tas), s 14. 
12 That is, the person or persons who have parental responsibility in relation to the child, Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 10H(3)(b). 
12 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, The Senate, Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005, 
Revised Explanatory Memorandum at [493], [518]. 
12 Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC), Family Violence – A National Response, Report 114 (2010), Chapter 22: Confidentiality 
and Admissibility at [22.28]-[22.32], http://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/family-violence-national-legal-response-alrc-report-114. For a 
description of coercive and controlling violence see Kelly JB and Johnson MP, “Differentiation Among Types of Intimate Partner Violence: 
Research Update and Implications For Interventions” (2008) 46(3) Family Court Review 476 at 481-484. 
12 Most submissions responding to the ALRC’s proposed amendments supported these suggested amendments. ALRC, n 31 at [22.24]. 
12 ALRC, n 31 at [22.23]. 
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(2) A [family counsellor/FDRP] must disclose a communication if the 
[counsellor/practitioner] reasonably believes the disclosure is necessary for the purposes 
of complying with a law of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory.  
(3) A [family counsellor/FDRP] may disclose a communication if consent to the 
disclosure is given by: 
(a) if the person who made the communication is 18 or over – that person; or 
(b) if the person who made the communication is a child under 18: 
(i) each person who has parental responsibility (within the meaning of Part VII) for 
the child; or 
(ii) a court. 
(4) A [family counsellor/FDRP] may disclose a communication if the 
[counsellor/practitioner] reasonably believes that the disclosure is necessary for the 
purpose of: 
(a) protecting a child from the risk of harm (whether physical or psychological); or 
(b) preventing or lessening a serious and imminent threat to the life or health of a 
person; or 
(c) reporting the commission, or preventing the likely commission, of an offence 
involving violence or a threat of violence to a person; or 
(d) preventing or lessening a serious and imminent threat to the property of a person; or 
(e) reporting the commission, or preventing the likely commission, of an offence 
involving intentional damage to property of a person or a threat of damage to property; 
or 
(f) if a lawyer independently represents a child’s interests under an order under 
section 68L – assisting the lawyer to do so properly.20 
                                                            
20 ALRC, n 31 at [22.20]-[22.22]. The amendments to the Privacy Act to remove “imminent” and to include “serious threat to the life, health 
or safety of any individual” were made in the Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Act 2012 (Cth). 
20 ALRC, n 31 at [22.26]. 
20 And family consultant; Independent Children’s Lawyer, arbitrator and certain other court Registrars. 
20 Pursuant to Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 67ZB if a FDRP makes a notification under s 67ZA he or she will be immune from liability in 
civil and criminal proceedings and not considered to have breached any professional ethics. 
20 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss 10E(1) and 10J(1). These sections also state that generally anything said, or any admission made, by or in 
the company of a person to whom a counsellor or FDRP refers a person for medical or other professional consultation, while the person is 
carrying out professional services for the person is inadmissible, subject to the exceptions set out in ss 10E(2) and (3) and 10J(2) and(3). 
Note that this article only discusses admissibility in relation to counsellors and FDRPs and will not extend to discussing it in relation to these 
other professionals. 
20 This is a certificate evidencing that a person who is under 18 and is wanting to marry has had counselling with a family counsellor. 
20 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss 10D(7), 10H(6). 
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 In summary, the counsellor or FDRP must disclose a communication if it is required by 
law. In some States and Territories practitioners have mandatory reporting requirements to 
child safety authorities in relation to abuse of children. In Western Australia, counsellors and 
FDRPs are required to make a notification where they have reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that a child has been or is at risk of abuse, ill treatment or psychological harm.21 In 
Victoria, registered psychologists22 are required to report if they believe on reasonable 
grounds that a child is in need of protection23 due to concerns that they have suffered or will 
suffer harm as a result of sexual, physical or psychological abuse and ill health.24 Social 
workers and psychologists25 in South Australia must notify if they suspect on reasonable 
grounds that a child has been or is being abused or neglected.26 Tasmanian psychologists27 
must report where they know, believe or suspect on reasonable grounds that a child is 
suffering, has suffered or is likely to suffer abuse or neglect or that an unborn child will be 
likely to suffer abuse or neglect or require medical treatment or intervention as a result of the 
behaviour of the mother.28 
 Under ss 10D and 10H counsellors and FDRPs may disclose a statement if there is 
consent by the adult participant who made it, or where a child made a relevant statement, 
with the consent of the parents or the court.29 Further, a communication can be revealed if it 
is essential to protect a person or property from harm, to prevent the commission of an 
offence or if necessary to assist the Independent Children’s Lawyer. The Revised 
Explanatory Memorandum to the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) 
Bill 2005 (Cth) stated that there was intended to be a clear delineation between “the 
circumstances in which disclosure is mandatory from those circumstances in which 
disclosure may occur”.30 
 While disclosure is permitted where there is a “threat to the life or health of a person”, the 
threat is currently required to be “serious and imminent”. The need for the threat to be 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
20 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss 10E(3), 10J(3). 
 
22 Children Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic), s 182. 
23 Children Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic), s 184 
24 Children Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic), s 162 
25 Children’s Protection Act 1993 (SA), s 11. 
26 Defined as sexual, physical, emotional abuse or neglect, Children’s Protection Act 1993 (SA), s 6. 
27 Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1997 (Tas), s 13. 
28 Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1997 (Tas), s 14. 
29 That is, the person or persons who have parental responsibility in relation to the child, Family Law Act 1975 
(Cth), s 10H(3)(b). 
30 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, The Senate, Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental 
Responsibility) Bill 2005, Revised Explanatory Memorandum at [493], [518]. 
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“imminent” has been criticised as potentially compromising the safety of victims of violence, 
particularly due to the coercive controlling nature of some forms of family violence. It was 
proposed by the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) in its 2010 report, Family 
Violence: A National Response31 that ss10D(4)(b) and 10H(4)(b) of the Family Law Act be 
amended to remove the requirement for a threat to be “imminent” and to add “safety” to “life 
or health” as a ground for disclosure.32 This would mean that counsellors and FDRPs could 
disclose communications where they reasonably believed it was necessary to prevent or 
lessen a serious threat to a person’s life, health or safety.33 The ALRC suggested that such 
amendments would bring these provisions into line with proposed amendments to the Privacy 
Act 1988 (Cth) in relation to permitted disclosure of personal information in particular 
situations.34 Also, the ALRC suggested that family counsellors and FDRPs should make 
immediate referrals to services such as the police, crisis counselling and legal assistance and 
develop safety plans in conjunction with the person or persons at risk.35 
 Although ss 10D and 10H set out some exceptional circumstances in which certain types 
of statements may be disclosed, the use of the word “may” leaves such disclosure to the 
discretion of the counsellor or practitioner. Also, the provisions do not specifically designate 
to whom the counsellor or mediator may disclose the statements and leaves this question 
open. Sections 10D and 10H can, however, be read together with s 67ZA of the Family Law 
Act. That section sets out that a family counsellor and FDRP36 must, as soon as practicable, 
make a notification to the relevant child safety authority in the particular State or Territory, if 
he or she has “reasonable grounds for suspecting that a child has been abused or is at risk of 
abuse”.37 There is no room for discretion in s 67ZA. It creates a clear obligation on 
counsellors and practitioners.  
                                                            
31 Commonwealth of Australia, Family Law Council, Family Law and Child Protection: Final Report (2002), Chapter 7: Confidentiality of 
Disclosures of Child Abuse. Referred to in Parkinson P, Australian Family Law in Context: Commentary and Materials (5th ed, Thomson 
Reuters, 2012) p 278. 
31 Commonwealth of Australia, Family Law Council, n 48 at [7.17]. 
31 National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council, Primary Dispute Resolution in Family Law, A Report to the Attorney-General 
on Part 5 of the Family Law Regulations (Canberra, March 1997). 
31 Which may have contained information concerning abuse of a child of the marriage. 
31 Relationships Australia v Pasternak (1996) 133 FLR 462 at 471; [1996] FLC 92-699. 
31 At that time s 19N did not contain the exceptions to admissibly for disclosures that revealed abuse or a risk of abuse.  
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 However, this leaves statements, such as threats of harm, to be disclosed at the discretion 
of the counsellor or practitioner. It is argued that this is a flaw in the provisions, as it means 
that a counsellor or FDRP is not required to inform the person against whom the threat has 
been made, potentially compromising that person’s safety. Under ss10D and 10H, the other 
people that a practitioner may need to notify of a disclosure of abuse or a threat of harm, 
could include the other parent and the potential victim of the threat (if the victim is not the 
other parent). It is suggested that ss 10D and 10H should be amended so that the counsellor or 
practitioner must disclose the communication, particularly where a threat of harm is made to 
a child or another adult. 
Sections 10E and 10J: Admissibility 
Sections 10E and 10J deal with admissibility and state that generally anything said or any 
admission made, by or in the company of a counsellor or FDRP while conducting counselling 
or FDR, will not be admissible in a later court or tribunal hearing, unless it falls within 
certain exceptional circumstances.38 The exceptions relevant to the current discussion are as 
follows: 
 (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to: 
(a) an admission by an adult that indicates that a child under 18 has been abused or is at 
risk of abuse; or 
(b) a disclosure by a child under 18 that indicates that the child has been abused or is at 
risk of abuse; 
unless, in the opinion of the court, there is sufficient evidence of the admission or 
disclosure available to the court from other sources. 
                                                            
38 W v W  (2001) 164 FLR 18; [2001] FLC 93-085 at [99]. For a discussion see the report of the Commonwealth of Australia, Family 
Law Council, n 48, pp 102-103. 
38 Commonwealth of Australia, Family Law Council, n 48. 
38 Family Law Amendment Act 2003 (Cth). For further reasons behind the amendments see Family Law Amendment Bill 2003, Bills Digest 
No. 12 2003-2004, Passage History, Disclosure About Allegations of Child Abuse, 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/bd/bd0304/04bd012. 
38 Family Law Legislation Amendment (Family Violence and Other Measures Act) 2011 (Cth). 
38 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 4AB. 
38 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 4(1). 
38 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 60CC(2A). 
38 Family Law Courts, Family Violence Best Practice Principles, Edition 3.1 (April 2013), 
http://www.familylawcourts.gov.au/wps/wcm/connect/FLC/Home/Publications/Family+Law+Courts+publications/fv_best_practice_for_flc. 
38 Altobelli T and Bryant D, “Chapter 19: Has Confidentiality in Family Dispute Resolution Reached its Use-by Date?” in Hayes and 
Higgins (eds), n 6, p 200. Note that 49 (52%) of family consultants surveyed responded to the survey. 
38 Altobelli and Bryant, n 62, pp.203-205. 
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 There are also provisions that permit information necessary for the FDRP to give a 
certificate regarding attendance at FDR under s 60I(8) or for a counsellor to provide a 
certificate under s 16(2A)(a) of the Marriage Act 1961(Cth)39, to be disclosed40 and 
admissible in court.41 Apart from this, only statements made that reveal that a child has been 
abused or may be at risk of abuse will be admissible in court.  
 These exceptions in relation to admissions of abuse or risk of abuse were derived from 
the former admissibility provision in the Family Law Act, s 19N.42 There is a further 
restriction in that, if in the opinion of the court, there is sufficient evidence of an admission or 
disclosure from another source, the communication will not be admissible. 43  
 It is evident that the exceptions in the admissibility provisions are much more narrowly 
construed than those contained in the confidentiality provisions. When read together, there 
are some important distinctions in scope and effect that create stark differences between what 
can be disclosed by counsellors or FDRPs as compared with what information will be 
admissible in court. If applying the provisions to a particular fact scenario, such as where one 
parent makes a threat to harm the other parent during counselling or mediation, ss 10D and 
10H make clear that such a threat will not be confidential.44 As the provisions are silent in 
relation to whom the communication may be disclosed, the practitioner could notify the 
potential victim, being the other parent, and the police. However, both provisions provide that 
the practitioner “may disclose a communication” so such notifications are at the discretion of 
the practitioner. Also, although the threat falls within the definition of “family violence” in 
the Family Law Act,45 such behaviour is not included in the exceptions to inadmissibility. 
Consequently, the counsellor or mediator could not be subpoenaed to court to give evidence 
in relation to the threat and any notes taken during the session will be inadmissible.  
                                                            
39 Reich JB, “A Call for Intellectual Honesty: A Response to the Uniform Mediation Act’s Privilege Against Disclosure” (2001) 2 Journal of 
Dispute Resolution 197. This article is cited in Altobelli and Bryant, n 62 at p 197. 
39 Degraves v Searle [2013] FCCA 660 at [19]. 
39 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 10E(2)(a). 
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 These differences between the confidentiality and admissibility provisions are 
strengthened by ss 10D(6) and 10H(7) which state that: 
Evidence that would be inadmissible because of section [10E/10J] is not admissible 
merely because this section requires or authorises its disclosure. 
This reinforces the fact that the exceptions to inadmissibility in FDR and counselling are 
narrowly defined and limited to admissions or disclosures of abuse or risk of abuse of 
children under 18.  
 The ALRC, in its 2010 report, considered whether ss 10E and 10J should be amended 
to add another exception so as to render disclosures of family violence admissible in 
court. After weighing up the competing arguments the ALRC were of the view that: 
 the arguments in favour of making disclosures about family violence admissible do 
not outweigh the public interest in protecting the integrity and ability of FDR and 
family counselling to secure safe outcomes for family violence victims and those at 
risk of family violence.46 
The ALRC decided that the public interest in absolute confidentiality of the process 
outweighed the benefits to victims in ensuring that all relevant information could be placed 
before courts. The relevance of this view subsequent to the 2011 amendments to the Family 
Law Act47 is questioned below, when the competing public policy considerations and the 
recent case law relating to disclosures of child abuse and family violence made in counselling 
are examined. 
COMPETING POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
Before turning to the recent case law, it is helpful to discuss the opposing policy 
considerations which are at play and also to examine how such concepts have evolved with 
time. In the 2002 report, Family Law and Child Protection: Final Report,48 the Family Law 
                                                            
46 Degraves v Searle [2013] FCCA 660 at [78]. 
46 Degraves v Searle [2013] FCCA 660 at [79]. 
46 That set out that the court must take prompt action in relation to allegations of child abuse or family violence, particularly after the filing 
of a notice under Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 67Z92) or s 67ZBA(2). 
46 Family Law Courts, n 61. 
46 Degraves v Searle [2013] FCCA 660 at [88]. 
46 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 10D(4)(b). 
46 Letter Family Law Council to Commonwealth Attorney-General (12 October 2010). 
46 Law Council of Australia, Integrity of ADR Processes, Submission (26 August 2010). 
46 “Protect Children and the Mediation Process”, The Sydney Morning Herald (26 February 2010), http://www.smh.com.au/federal-
politics/editorial/protect-children-and-the-mediation-process-20100225-p5ti.html. 
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Council dealt with the competing policy arguments. The public interest grounds for 
confidentiality and a prohibition on admissibility of statements made in counselling, which 
could be described as a strict, traditionalist approach, were explained as follows: 
The rationale for maintaining such a sweeping exclusionary provision is to be found in a 
concern not to compromise the ability of parties undergoing counselling to discuss in a 
free and frank manner their relationship difficulties. The provision, it is argued, allows 
parties to explore possibilities for improving relationships in as confidential a framework 
as possible, without feeling that they must carefully watch what they say in case it is 
subsequently used against them in criminal, family, or civil proceedings.49 
 This report also contained a summary of the public policy reasons for statements made in 
mediation being confidential and inadmissible, which was extracted from the National 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council’s 1997 report, Primary Dispute Resolution 
in the Family Court:50 
Mediators consider the prohibition on calling evidence to be essential to the integrity of the 
mediation process for the following reasons: 
 the participants need to feel free to be honest and open and to negotiate freely if disputes 
are to be resolved successfully. If the participants fear that what they say will later be used 
as evidence in a court it will constrain their ability to do so; 
 if the mediator could subsequently be called to give evidence the informality of the process 
might be compromised by the mediator’s concern to avoid being required to give evidence 
of what was said in the mediation; 
 the possibility that the mediator might be brought before a court to give evidence of what 
happened would affect the participants’ trust in the mediator; and 
 the participants may be encouraged to continue the marital fight in court and to draw the 
mediator (and others) into it. 
 This strict traditionalist approach was adopted in the 1996 case Relationships Australia v 
Pasternak (1996) 133 FLR 462; [1996] FLC 92-699 where the Full Court of the Family 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
48 Chisholm R, Family Courts Violence Review (27 November 2009), p 79. 
48 Chisholm, n 77, pp11-12. 
48 Unitingcare Unifam Counselling Mediation v Harkiss (2011) 252 FLR 309; [2011] FamCAFC 159 at [2]. 
48 Unitingcare Unifam Counselling Mediation v Harkiss (2011) 252 FLR 309; [2011] FamCAFC 159 [2]. 
48 Harkiss v Beamish (2011) 251 FLR 412; [2011] FMCAfam 527 at [4]-[5]. 
48 Harkiss v Beamish (2011) 251 FLR 412; [2011] FMCAfam 527 at [11] 
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Court set aside an order of the trial judge allowing inspection of documents from 
counselling51 by legal advisors. At that time the Full Court was of the view that maintaining 
the confidence of statements made in counselling “trumped” the paramountcy of the welfare 
of the child and stated: 
Accordingly, in balancing the public interest in the paramountcy of the welfare of the 
child against the public interest in the maintenance of the confidence of statements made 
in the course of marriage counselling, we consider that the scales come down squarely in 
favour of the latter.52 
 There are obviously strong arguments for communications in counselling and mediation 
to be confidential and not able to be used in court. However, in the alternative, the opposing 
view has also been clearly represented and there are persuasive reasons for the admission into 
evidence of information that will assist courts to protect the safety of victims of abuse and 
family violence. This could be described as a more protectionist approach. 
 An example of this alternative view was expressed by the Full Court of the Family Court 
in the case of W v W  (2001) 164 FLR 18; [2001] FLC 93-085 per Nicholson CJ and O’Ryan 
J. The facts were that an affidavit of a counsellor containing alleged admissions by the father 
of inappropriate sexual behaviour was deemed inadmissible due to then s 19N.53 The Full 
Court of the Family Court of Australia dismissed an application for leave to adduce fresh 
evidence. However, the court criticised the drafting and operation of s 19N and highlighted 
the policy considerations aimed at protection of the rights of the individual: 
In our view, it is most unfortunate that the legislation contains no exception to the 
legislative prohibition to the giving of such evidence in circumstances where its non-
receipt may impinge on the best interests of children. This means that a court that is 
required to make decisions treating the best interests of children as the paramount 
consideration in determining issues such as residence and contact must do so without 
having any knowledge of important and relevant facts that could affect such a decision.54 
                                                            
51 Harkiss v Beamish (2011) 251 FLR 412; [2011] FMCAfam 527 at [41]. 
51 Trappe v Vonne [2009] FMCAfam 497 at [14]-[15]. 
51 Trappe v Vonne [2009] FMCAfam 497 at [34]. 
51 Trappe v Vonne [2009] FMCAfam 497 at [31]. 
51 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 4(1). 
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 Concerns were raised in the Family Law Council Family Law and Child Protection: 
Final Report about the outcome of W v W and the impact of s 19N.55 Subsequently, s 19N 
was amended to include exceptions to admissibility for statements regarding abuse or the risk 
of abuse to a child,56 which were then adopted in the current admissibility provisions.  
 More recently, the amendments made to the Family Law Act in 201157 indicate that, in 
parenting proceedings, courts should place increased weight on the protection of children 
from harm and abuse. This is reinforced by the broadened definitions of “family violence”58 
and “abuse”59 and the requirement for the court to prioritise protection from harm over 
meaningful relationships.60 A different climate now exists in the family law system 
subsequent to these amendments and the focus on protection of victims. This has been 
reinforced by the Family Court of Australia, Family Violence Best Practice Principles61 
which direct judicial officers to prioritise the safety of victims of violence and abuse and 
specifically state that:  
The courts aim to protect children and family members from all forms of harm resulting 
from family violence and abuse. 
 It is suggested that, in light of the 2011 amendments and the implementation of the 
Family Court’s Best Practice Principles, the confidentiality and admissibility provisions need 
to evolve accordingly. Consequently, it is now open for judicial officers to interpret these 
provisions of the Family Law Act in a more liberal, protectionist manner. 
 Further, recent research questions the fundamental basis for a strict, traditionalist 
approach, ie the assumption that clients will be less honest and open if they are aware that 
their counselling or mediation process is not confidential. In a recent Family Consultant’s 
Confidentiality Survey a total of 94% of respondents reported that parents “never” or “rarely” 
expressed concerns about the absence of confidentiality when participating in the s 11F 
                                                            
 
56 Reithmuller FM also took into account that the wife had not filed a risk of child abuse. 
56 This followed the approach of Carmody J in Relationships Australia (Qld) v M (2006) 204 FLR 440; [2006] FLC 93-305. 
56 Reithmuller FM also ordered that the wife pay Lifeworks costs (at [48]). 
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reportable family consultant processes.62 The authors reported that “admissions are routinely 
made in s 11F conferences” and that the research cast doubts on the view that confidentiality 
is integral to processes such as counselling and FDR.63 This is supported by previous research 
where patients’ willingness to disclose information to their psychotherapists was not 
impacted by whether the process was confidential.64 
 In recent times judicial officers have been asked to interpret the confidentiality and 
admissibility provisions in the context of cases that have occurred in counselling. The 
following discussion sheds light on whether the courts have been taking a strictly 
traditionalist approach to the provisions or a more protectionist approach, focusing on the 
rights of individuals to safety. It is demonstrated that the drafting of the provisions has 
created some unfortunate blocks to judicial officers taking a more liberal approach and raises 
concerns as to the impact of the operation of these provisions in practice.  
THE RECENT CASE LAW 
Degraves v Searle [2013] FCCA 660 highlights the stark differences between the 
confidentiality and admissibility provisions. The parties had been involved in ongoing 
parenting proceedings and had been ordered by the court under s 13C of the Family Law Act 
to attend the Unifam Keeping in Contact program. As part of the court process a Family 
Report had been prepared and issued, but the parents continued to try to resolve their 
parenting matters. To assist with this they persisted with their involvement in the Keeping in 
Contact program until an incident occurred that led the counsellor to terminate their 
involvement in the program. 
 This incident was communicated when the counsellor telephoned the mother and 
informed her that the father had made certain threats against the mother in one of his solo 
sessions and that, in her view, both parents could consequently no longer participate in the 
program. Subsequently the mother applied to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia for 
various restraining orders seeking personal protection for herself and the children against the 
father. She sought to include the statements made to her by the counsellor in her affidavit 
                                                            
 
62 Altobelli T and Bryant D, “Chapter 19: Has Confidentiality in Family Dispute Resolution Reached its Use‐by 
Date?” in Hayes and Higgins (eds), n 6, p 200. Note that 49 (52%) of family consultants surveyed responded to 
the survey. 
63 Altobelli and Bryant, n 62, pp.203‐205. 
64 Reich JB, “A Call for Intellectual Honesty: A Response to the Uniform Mediation Act’s Privilege Against 
Disclosure” (2001) 2 Journal of Dispute Resolution 197. This article is cited in Altobelli and Bryant, n 62 at p 
197. 
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material. The sections of the mother’s affidavit relevant to the issues that came before the 
court were as follows: 
On 10 April 20113 [sic] after attending about 6 appointments with Unifam I received a 
telephone call from Ms C from Unifam where she said words to the effect: “In a session 
with me [Mr Searle] made several statements that could be construed as a threat against 
your life”. 
On 17 April 2013 I received a telephone call from Ms C from Unifam where she said 
words to the effect: “The Keeping in Contact Program is now finished because of what 
[Mr Searle] did the other day”.65 
 His Honour Judge Harman was required to decide whether these paragraphs in the 
mother’s affidavit should be struck out as they related to conversations between the 
counsellor and mother and were potentially inadmissible under s 10E of the Family Law Act 
which does not contain any exceptions so as to render threats made towards the other parent 
admissible.  
 Judge Harman initiated an investigation into whether the only possible exception 
available under s 10E could apply, which was whether the statement made by the father 
constituted, “an admission by an adult that indicates that a child under 18 has been abused or 
is at risk of abuse”.66 His Honour examined whether the alleged threat by the father towards 
the mother constituted “abuse” to the child of the relationship in that, if the threat was carried 
out, it could result in serious psychological harm to the child in being exposed to family 
violence. His Honour noted that the definition of “abuse” in s 4(1 ) of the Family Law Act 
included, “causing the child to suffer serious psychological harm, including (but not limited 
to) when that harm is caused by the child being subjected to, or exposed to, family violence”. 
 His Honour then went on to state that:  
On the above basis a risk of abuse may be established if a clear threat were made by one 
parent with respect to the life of the other (as the carrying out of that threat would likely 
cause serious psychological harm to the child if the child were so exposed thereto and 
adopting the broad interpretation of “exposure” implied and inferred by the definition of 
family violence in section 4AB). However, the paragraphs sought to be relied upon by Ms 
                                                            
65 Degraves v Searle [2013] FCCA 660 at [19]. 
66 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 10E(2)(a). 
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Degraves do not contain evidence of any specific statement by Mr Searle but purely a 
construction or interpretation of a statement by Mr Searle.67 
 Judge Harman explained his decision that the content of the affidavit material in question 
was inadmissible as he did not consider it indicated “abuse” by the father:  
Thus I am not satisfied that the exception contained within section 10E(2) as to a risk of 
abuse could be made out even if one adopted such a broad interpretation of the term 
“abuse”.68 
 Unfortunately it appeared that, as the counsellor had not recounted to the mother the 
specific words of the threat, the paragraphs in the mother’s affidavit material did not set out 
precise enough details of the threat for it to be determined “psychological abuse” to the child. 
 Judge Harman went on to reject the mother’s lawyer’s alternate submissions that the 
threats should have been admitted into evidence on public policy grounds due to the 
principles of protecting litigants under s 67ZBB69 of the Family Law Act and the Family 
Court’s Family Violence Best Practice Principles.70 Judge Harman stated that, in his view, 
“public policy” required a very narrow interpretation of the confidentiality and admissibility 
provisions and stated: 
To the extent that it might, thus, be suggested that there is a “public policy” consideration 
raised in this case, it is more relevantly directed to the exclusion of evidence from sources 
otherwise legislatively protected as confidential and inadmissible and supportive of a 
narrow interpretation of the exceptions (and balanced against the Court’s obligations 
pursuant to provisions such as section 67ZBB).71 
 Therefore His Honour took a traditionalist, strict view of the public policy considerations. 
However, Judge Harman condoned the counsellor’s disclosure of the threat to the mother, as 
it was permissible under the broader exceptions to confidentiality in s 10D(4)(b), as being 
necessary in “preventing or lessening a serious and imminent threat to the life or health of a 
person”.72  
 This case highlights the severe limitations of the admissibility provisions. Unlike the 
confidentially provisions, they do not contain exceptions so that information about family 
                                                            
67 Degraves v Searle [2013] FCCA 660 at [78]. 
68 Degraves v Searle [2013] FCCA 660 at [79]. 
69 That set out that the court must take prompt action in relation to allegations of child abuse or family 
violence, particularly after the filing of a notice under Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 67Z92) or s 67ZBA(2). 
70 Family Law Courts, n 61. 
71 Degraves v Searle [2013] FCCA 660 at [88]. 
72 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 10D(4)(b). 
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violence, including threats made to the life or health of a person, can be put before the court. 
This is a concerning limitation and a call for amendments to these provisions was made by 
the Family Law Council in 2010.73 The issue was also considered by the Law Council of 
Australia in its Submission to the National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council 
(NADRAC) inquiry into the Integrity of ADR Processes.74 This submission highlighted that 
the Chief Justice of the Family Court of Australia, Diana Bryant, had suggested that 
consideration be given to waiving non-admissibility in family violence cases so that judges 
can access all relevant information when making their decisions.75 
 It is clearly concerning that in Degraves v Searle the mother was unable to admit into 
evidence threats made to her by the father and was therefore unsuccessful in her application 
for restraining orders for personal protection against her former partner. Unfortunately, even 
though the Family Law Act was amended in 2011 to strengthen its protection of victims of 
violence and abuse, no amendments were made to ss 10H and 10J.76 This was despite the 
report of Professor Richard Chisholm, Family Courts Violence Review, which provided the 
impetus for the 2011 reforms, in which he stated: 
in my view the court’s ability to conduct a risk assessment process, and its capacity to 
protect the children and families that come before it, would almost certainly be enhanced 
if it had access to relevant information held by external agencies, including dispute 
resolution agencies.77 
 Chisholm’s report even contained a recommendation for amendments to the Family Law 
Act in relation to these issues: 
Recommendation 2.5 
That the Government consider amending provisions of the Act relating to the 
confidentiality of information held by agencies outside the court, including dispute 
resolution agencies, so that information relevant to the assessment of the risks from 
violence or other causes could be more readily available to the courts.78 
                                                            
73 Letter Family Law Council to Commonwealth Attorney‐General (12 October 2010). 
74 Law Council of Australia, Integrity of ADR Processes, Submission (26 August 2010). 
75 “Protect Children and the Mediation Process”, The Sydney Morning Herald (26 February 2010), 
http://www.smh.com.au/federal‐politics/editorial/protect‐children‐and‐the‐mediation‐process‐20100225‐
p5ti.html. 
76 Family Law Legislation Amendment (Family Violence and Other Measures) Act 2011 (Cth). 
77 Chisholm R, Family Courts Violence Review (27 November 2009), p 79. 
78 Chisholm, n 77, pp11‐12. 
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 Therefore, Chisholm appeared to be recommending that the regulation of confidentiality 
and admissibility surrounding dispute resolution, at the very least, be relaxed, so that relevant 
information could be available to the court. It is therefore perplexing as to why these 
problematic provisions were not amended at such an opportune time. 
 Another case that raises similar concerns, however, in relation to the admissibility of 
information regarding the risk of abuse to a child is Unitingcare Unifam Counselling 
Mediation v Harkiss (2011) 252 FLR 309; [2011] FamCAFC 159. Unifam had refused to 
comply with a subpoena arising out of a counselling session, citing ss 10D and 10E and 
public policy grounds, “because family counselling is undertaken on the basis of an 
assumption of confidentiality, and that there is a substantial public interest policy in 
maintaining confidentiality in family counselling”.79 The subpoena requested that the 
following information be made available to the court: 
All records in relation to [MS BEAMISH] AND [MR HARKISS] including any reports 
or allegations, counselling notes, referrals, and file notes.80 
 The subpoena had issued as the mother’s lawyers were seeking to admit into evidence 
notes taken by the counsellor. The mother alleged that the father had made admissions about 
his conduct during counselling which may have led to the conclusion that the child was at 
risk of abuse. The father strenuously denied that he had made such admissions. Both parents 
consented to the counsellor’s notes being produced. 
 Federal Magistrate Altobelli, in the first instance decision Harkiss v Beamish (2011) 251 
FLR 412; [2011] FMCAfam 527, noted that s 10D(3(a) sets out that a family counsellor may 
disclose a communication, if consent to the disclosure is given by the person who made it and 
they were over 18.81 In this case the father had made the alleged statement and consented to 
the information being disclosed. Altobelli FM consequently held that Unifam had to comply 
with the subpoena. In obiter His Honour stated, “that the confidentiality is that of the parties 
to family counselling not the provider of family counselling”82 and therefore if the parents 
consented to disclosure it was not for Unifam to object to this.  
 Unifam appealed this decision and was ultimately successful as Coleman J of the Family 
Court of Australia took a different view and set the subpoena aside. His Honour held that s 
10D(3) stated that the family counsellor may disclose a communication and, because of the 
                                                            
79 Unitingcare Unifam Counselling Mediation v Harkiss (2011) 252 FLR 309; [2011] FamCAFC 159 at [2]. 
80 Unitingcare Unifam Counselling Mediation v Harkiss (2011) 252 FLR 309; [2011] FamCAFC 159 [2]. 
81 Harkiss v Beamish (2011) 251 FLR 412; [2011] FMCAfam 527 at [4]‐[5]. 
82 Harkiss v Beamish (2011) 251 FLR 412; [2011] FMCAfam 527 at [11] 
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use of the word “may”, the counsellor was not obliged to disclose the father’s statements. 
Coleman J took the view that there was nothing in s 10D(3) or in s 10D generally, or in s 
69ZX that had empowered Altobelli FM to order the family counsellor to disclose the 
communications made by the father. 
 In relation to the reasoning behind his decision Coleman J stated: 
Section 10D of the Act creates and defines the privilege attaching to communications 
made to a family counsellor in the conduct of family counselling, and articulates the 
circumstances in which that privilege may, or must be waived. Given the absence of 
legislative constraint upon the persons or entities to whom, or to which disclosed 
communications may be published, failure to observe the legislative imperatives of s 10D 
could have quite unintended consequences, and potentially adverse implications for the 
welfare of children referred to in, or connected with such communications.83 
 His Honour also dealt with whether s 10E(2) had empowered the trial judge to compel 
Unifam to produce the documents. His Honour held that the exception to admissibility under 
s 10E(2)(a), being where there is “an admission by an adult that indicates that a child under 
18 is abused or is at risk of abuse”, may have empowered Altobelli FM to make his order. 
However, as the subpoena was not drafted narrowly in the terms of this provision, ie it was 
not only directed to information relevant to a possible admission of abuse and was widely 
framed, it deprived the court of that power.  
 In that case Coleman J obviously took a very strict, traditionalist view of the public policy 
considerations. This was particularly so as the father, who had made the alleged statements, 
had consented to production of the file notes. It seems that it was clearly open to His Honour 
to take a different path to order the production of information limited to admissions in 
relation to abuse of a child or a risk of abuse.  
 Another relevant case is Trappe v Vonne [2009] FMCAfam 497 where a party was 
seeking to subpoena information from a counselling organisation and it refused to comply. 
The wife had issued a subpoena to Lifeworks for the production of documents in relation to 
counselling sessions between her and the husband. She alleged that the husband had an 
addiction to sex and pornography and that he would discuss sexual matters in front of their 
children. She also alleged that he had been physically and sexually violent and verbally 
abusive towards her, at times in front of the children. Her subpoena had been issued on the 
basis that the husband had made admissions about this behaviour in counselling sessions. 
                                                            
83 Harkiss v Beamish (2011) 251 FLR 412; [2011] FMCAfam 527 at [41]. 
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Whether the husband had made admissions to the counsellor was considered relevant to the 
wife’s credit in the proceedings.84 
 Federal Magistrate Reithmuller examined ss 10D and 10E. His Honour decided, for 
similar reasons to Coleman J in Unitingcare Unifam Counselling Mediation v Harkiss that, 
due to the use of the word “may”, s 10D(4) provided a discretion to the counsellor as to 
whether or not to disclose the information. The counsellor was therefore not obliged to make 
disclosure and the court did not have a general power to control the exercise of the 
counsellor’s discretion.85. His Honour also noted that, as the wife had communicated the 
alleged assaults by the husband to the police, there was no obligation on the counsellor to 
communicate this information to anyone as the wife had already done so.86 
 The Federal Magistrate also examined whether the information would be admissible 
under s 10E. However, the difficulty was that, at the time the case was considered, the 
definition of “abuse” in the Family Law Act was very limited and did not include the 
behaviour alleged. Today, with the new, much broader, definition of “abuse” the husband’s 
behaviour would fall within the definition as, “causing the child to suffer serious 
psychological harm, including (but not limited to) when that harm is caused by the child 
being subjected to, or exposed to, family violence”. 87  
 As the alleged behaviour of the husband was not caught under the previous definition of 
“abuse”, His Honour determined that the information would not be admissible under s 10E.88 
However, Reithmuller FM went even further and took the view that, because of the further 
provision in s 10E(2) that states that if evidence could be obtained about the disclosure from 
another source, the information would not be admissible, the subpoena issue could not be 
determined until the final hearing. His Honour was of the view that this issue should be 
considered on a voir dire at trial89 as it was only at that point in time that the court could be 
aware of the other available evidence and make a decision as to whether independent 
evidence on that point was available from another source.90  
 Again the judicial officer in question took an extremely restricted, traditionalist view of 
the operation of s 10E. The difficulty for the wife with this approach was that she would not 
                                                            
84 Trappe v Vonne [2009] FMCAfam 497 at [14]‐[15]. 
85 Trappe v Vonne [2009] FMCAfam 497 at [34]. 
86 Trappe v Vonne [2009] FMCAfam 497 at [31]. 
87 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 4(1). 
88 Reithmuller FM also took into account that the wife had not filed a risk of child abuse. 
89 This followed the approach of Carmody J in Relationships Australia (Qld) v M (2006) 204 FLR 440; [2006] FLC 93‐
305. 
90 Reithmuller FM also ordered that the wife pay Lifeworks costs (at [48]). 
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have been able to assess her prospects of success at a final hearing without knowing whether 
the counselling notes supported her contentions and whether the notes would be admissible in 
the final hearing. 
 The application of the confidentiality and admissibility provisions in these cases highlight 
clear concerns for victims and potential victims of violence and abuse. It is suggested that 
legislative reform is timely so that judicial officers can admit into evidence all relevant 
information to ensure that their decisions can be fully informed. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The discussion in this article demonstrates the inconsistencies in and the inadequacies of the 
current confidentiality and admissibility provisions of the Family Law Act. An outstanding 
concern is the current use of the word “may” in the confidentiality provisions, leaving it 
within the discretion of FDRPs and counsellors as to whether they inform potential victims or 
authorities of threats of harm. A further issue is the much narrower construction of the 
admissibility provisions, and their obvious failure in the cases outlined above, to enable 
courts to have access to all relevant information, particularly in relation to allegations of 
abuse and family violence. This obviously operates to the detriment of the victims of child 
abuse and family violence. It seems an unfortunate oversight that the 2011 amendments, that 
were explicitly aimed at strengthening the Family Law Act provisions to further protect such 
vulnerable parties in the family law system, did not address these deficiencies.  
 
Proposed amendments 
1. The following amendments are suggested: That the word “may” in ss 10D(3) and (4) 
and 10H(3) and (4) be amended to “must” so that the provisions state that: 
A family counsellor/family dispute resolution practitioner must disclose a 
communication… 
2. That ss 10D and 10H be altered so that their wording is less restrictive as follows:  
A family counsellor/ family dispute resolution practitioner must disclose a 
communication to an appropriate person or authority (for example, the victim, intended 
victim, parent of the victim or intended victim, owner of property, independent children’s 
lawyer, prescribed child welfare authority and/or the relevant police) if the practitioner 
reasonably believes that a statement has been made: 
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(a) that indicates that a child has been abused or is at risk of abuse; or 
(b) that indicates that a serious threat to the life, health or safety of a child or adult has 
been made or that the life, safety or health of a child or adult may be compromised 
due family violence; or 
(c) that reveals the commission or likely commission of an offence involving violence 
to a person or a threat of violence to a person; or 
(d) that reveals that there is a threat to the property of a person; or 
(e) that reveals the commission or preventing the likely commission of an offence 
involving intentional damage to property of a person or a threat of damage to the 
property of a person; or 
(f) that is made by a parent that is necessary to disclose to the independent children’s 
lawyer under s 68L to assist that lawyer represent the child or children properly. 
3. That the following exceptions be inserted into the admissibility provisions, ss 10E and 10J: 
Subsection (1) does not apply to statements: 
(a) that indicate that a child has been abused or is at risk of abuse; or 
(b) that indicate that a serious threat to the life, health or safety of a child or adult has 
been made or that the life, safety or health of a child or adult may be compromised due 
family violence; or 
(c) that reveal the commission or likely commission of an offence involving violence to a 
person or a threat of violence to a person; or 
(d) that reveal that there is a threat to the property of a person; or 
(e) that reveal the commission or prevent the likely commission of an offence involving 
intentional damage to property of a person or a threat of damage to the property of a 
person; or 
(f) that is made by a parent that is necessary to disclose to the independent children’s lawyer 
under s 68L to assist that lawyer represent the child or children properly. 
 
